Author of The Idea Factory
Jon Gertner is the author of The Idea Factory (2012), a history of how Bell Labs turned hard technical problems into products deployed at massive scale. The lesson most worth taking from him is that invention is not innovation: the work that pays is making the thing in quantity, reliably, and better or cheaper than what it replaces.
The very point of new ideas was to make them into new things.
The Idea Factory: Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation
Gertner wrote The Idea Factory (2012) about Bell Labs and American innovation. The book follows the research arm of monopoly AT&T, for decades the world's most innovative scientific organization. It asks how that lab turned hard problems into products used at massive scale.
The subtitle frames it as the great age of American innovation.
Gertner argues large organizations, not only nimble startups, can produce major innovation. He sees a three-step pattern: grasp a hard problem, gather ideas, then push to a product deployed at massive scale.
He says the pattern still fits today's wicked problems, such as information overload, infectious disease and climate change.
He sizes Bell Labs' mission as an effort rivaling Apollo and the Manhattan Project. Connecting everyone and their machines matched those projects in size, expense and duration. At its late-1960s peak the Labs employed about fifteen thousand people, including some twelve hundred PhDs.
Gertner does not hide the flaws in the Bell Labs model. It served a regulated monopoly watched by the government, and it had personality clashes, institutional arrogance and later strategic missteps.
He also notes that recruits may have come for the salary in a collapsed academic market, and that the whole formula relied on monopoly funding and captive markets.
Gertner opens with Edison's trial and error as the model that hit a wall. Around 1910 American industry advanced mostly through cut-and-try work. In 1877 Edison found a compressed carbon button improved the telephone mouthpiece, after trying lead, copper, manganese, graphite, osmium, silicon, boron, platinum and many other materials.
Edison was not anti-intellectual. He read widely and hired mathematicians for the theory, but he scorned theory itself.
He shows some limits were gaps in science, not gaps in engineering. Thick copper, loading coils and mechanical repeaters topped out around 1,700 miles, roughly New York to Denver. Stacking mechanical repeaters added distortion and undid the gain.
A coast-to-coast call needed an amplifier that science had not yet produced.
Jewett and Carty framed the 1909 bet as a short list of questions. Can we build it now? If not, what has science not shown? Will science show the way, and in time? The last question set the work plan: what must we do to make "possibly" into "probably" in two years?
They reached the framing in San Francisco, debating whether they could link New York to the coast in time for the exposition, and decided the crux was an amplifier.
Jewett asked Millikan for his best students and gave Arnold one dated task. In fall 1910 Harold Arnold accepted, and his sole job was a repeater. His high-vacuum tube carried the transcontinental line, which opened in 1915.
The line ran four copper wires on 130,000 poles, and a three-minute call to California cost about $21, about $440 today. The win justified hiring more young scientists, including Kelly in late 1917 at $2,100 a year.
Gertner shows scientists were hired to serve the phone system, not science. Harvey Fletcher had a physics PhD, yet spent his first year at Western Electric climbing poles, installing phones and running switchboards. Later recruits sat through weeks of seminars on how the Bell System worked.
Jewett was clear the lab existed to raise phone revenue. AT&T publicity later suggested scientists came for science, which Gertner treats as incidental.
He credits a growing system for never running out of hard problems. Phone parts had to last forty years, so engineers built a woodpecker machine for finishes, an artificial mouth for handsets and a simulated finger for dialing. The 512A teletypewriter oiler was designed to dispense up to fifteen drops and no more.
Donald Quarles's team found eight inches of vertical wire spacing prevented abrasion, where company practice had suggested twelve. Steel tape on cables kept gophers off.
Kelly's clear target gave direction when nobody knew the method. In 1937 Kelly told Shockley he wanted the relays out of telephone exchanges, replaced by something electronic. On December 29, 1939, Shockley sketched a copper-oxide solid-state amplifier in his notebook.
Brattain laughed because he had already tried a variation. Units built in early 1940 showed nothing, and the war halted the work.
Gertner credits a protected monopoly for the patience that research needs. Vail accepted regulated prices and profits in exchange for a cleared path to near monopoly, which gave a decades-long horizon. Stable funding let the lab plan five, ten and twenty years out, and guaranteed markets meant good work would be used.
Kelly twice handed the AT&T president his resignation over underfunded work. Both times he got the money. Bell Telephone Laboratories began January 1, 1925, with a budget of about $12 million.
He describes Murray Hill as a building engineered for collisions. Every wing connected, a 700-foot physics corridor ran through it, and labs and offices were kept apart so people had to walk past each other. Steel walls moved in six-foot steps so teams could resize fast.
More than eighty industrial labs visited to copy it. It opened in 1942, cost about $4.1 million and held about nine hundred scientists and assistants.
Kelly built teams by mixing skills and paying for the missing piece. In July 1945 he regrouped research into interdisciplinary teams. Shockley and Fisk judged only about three people in the country could fill the group's theory gap, and Kelly offered Bardeen a salary well above any university's.
With no office free, Bardeen joined in October 1945 and set up in the lab Brattain shared. That accident started the theorist and experimenter partnership. One demoted supervisor wept as Kelly read the new structure aloud.
Gertner shows skilled support staff and in-house training as real infrastructure. Bell Labs employed thousands of technical assistants, some with only a high school diploma, and started Kelly College in 1948 to train staff beyond graduate school. Universities could offer only half, or at best two-thirds, of the Labs' $3,000 starting salary.
Physicist John Rowell called the assistants keepers of practical information, secrets, tricks and lore.
For TAT-1, Kelly chose proven parts and then squeezed more from them. He barred the new transistor and used late-1930s vacuum tubes, some tested continuously for sixteen years, because the cable had to run twenty years without failure. TAT-1 opened September 25, 1956, and its technology never failed once in twenty-two years.
TASI later doubled the cable from thirty-six to seventy-two channels by reusing pauses in speech, since a talker sends signals only about 35 percent of the time.
Gertner separates discovery, invention and innovation as three different stages. Discovery observes nature. Invention engineers science into something new. Innovation turns that into a product in wide practical use.
Karl Jansky heard a steady hiss from the Milky Way at Holmdel in the early 1930s. It founded radio astronomy but never produced a profitable telecom device, and discoveries, unlike inventions, are not patentable.
He tells how the transistor's verification climbed one level at a time. Ralph Bown's test was to show gain on real speech, feed output back into input, and confirm a steady oscillation. News then went up one management level at a time, a week or two apart, and Kelly heard about a month later.
On December 16, 1947, Brattain slit gold foil on a plastic triangle with a razor and got real gain. Neither he nor Robert Gibney fully understood the physics.
The transistor shows how long turning an invention into innovation takes. It was discovered and invented in a few weeks of late 1947, but humidity, a hand wave or a slammed door changed the point-contact version's behavior. Jack Morton's team made five thousand working units by summer 1949, and the device was ready for large-scale production only by summer 1951.
Gordon Teal worked secretly from 5 p.m. to 3 a.m. on borrowed equipment to pull single germanium crystals. Shockley called the result the essential missing ingredient.
Gertner shows manufacturability, not peak performance, picked the winning transistor. The first silicon transistor in January 1954 mattered little because it was too complex to mass produce. Tanenbaum's 1955 diffused silicon transistor beat every germanium device and looked easy to make.
Tanenbaum judged it a cinch to make, and Morton cut short a European trip to back it. Kelly's better-or-cheaper test also applied to switching, so electronic switching took nearly twenty years to fully deploy.
The silicon solar battery shows a brilliant pilot failing on cost. It was at least fifteen times more efficient than prior converters, yet cost several hundred dollars per watt. In 1956 Chapin put the cost of powering a house at nearly $1.5 million.
In space nothing else could recharge batteries, so the weakness stopped mattering and the cell found its problem.
Bell spread the transistor on purpose, and Gertner notes the antitrust pressure behind it. Bell gave away samples, licensed for $25,000, and taught hundreds at Murray Hill conventions in 1951 and 1952. Outside engineers improved the device, and the originator was best placed to profit.
MIT's Jay Forrester saw it might serve high-speed digital computing, a use Bell had not planned. The openness was partly forced, since hoarding the device risked antitrust scrutiny.
Gertner presents Claude Shannon as a lone mind who founded a field. Shannon's 1948 communication paper appeared in the Bell System Technical Journal in July and October, and the word bit came from John Tukey. He stated the field's main results and proved most of them at once.
Gertner's point is that the transistor would likely have arrived elsewhere within a couple of years, while Shannon was different. Shannon still insisted his work did not rank with relativity.
Gertner shows Shannon's unstructured freedom giving fame but fading output. Theseus, the maze mouse, made him a public figure, and his 1949 chess paper was the first ever on chess programming. Unfinished papers piled up in boxes and most letters went unanswered.
In 1956 he left for MIT, feeling stale after fifteen years. Managers were reassured when chess was framed as a wedge toward call routing, translation and military decisions.
He credits John Pierce as the instigator who spots and pushes ideas. Pierce found Kompfner's traveling wave tube in a 1943 British report and brought it to Bell Labs. He also named the transistor and pushed Max Mathews toward computer music in 1957.
His summary of the tube: "Rudi invented the traveling wave tube and I discovered it." His harsh reviews had costs, and people feared his office.
Shockley shows how a manager competing with his reports can wreck a team. Left out of the point-contact invention, Shockley filled 19 notebook pages in 2 days over New Year's Eve and designed the junction transistor in secret. The design was better, but Bardeen left for Illinois and Brattain asked to stop reporting to him.
Kelly judged him unfit for upper management and refused to promote him. Shockley left for Palo Alto, and in 1957 Moore and seven others left after he asked staff to take polygraph tests.
Gertner reads the stars' fading outside the Labs as proof of the institution. Outside the Labs, Shockley's science dried up without supervisors and technicians to offset his flaws. Shannon turned to the stock market and juggling, and Pierce found Caltech unmoored.
Bardeen is the counterexample: at Illinois he won a second physics Nobel in 1972 for superconductivity.
He portrays Bill Baker probing any claim that a topic was completely understood. At a monthly meeting the director of chemical research called a topic completely understood. Baker asked a question, then a question about the answer, layer by layer, until it was clear the topic was not understood at all.
The habit had a cost: Baker revealed little of himself, and even close colleagues were unsure what he meant. Gertner also notes a patent study in which top inventors often ate with Harry Nyquist, who drew them out with good questions.
Gertner shows Pierce's satellite built from parts made for other jobs. Telstar combined sixteen Bell inventions patented over twenty-five years, none made for space. Chaffee's 1937 frequency modulation feedback receiver, thought largely useless, proved vital for Echo and Telstar.
Rockets and money came only after Sputnik in October 1957, then the creation of NASA.
He credits a cheap research experiment before the full development build. Echo, a passive balloon, cost under $2 million and used about three dozen men. Telstar took more than five hundred engineers and fifteen thousand parts, and NASA charged $3 million to launch it on June 10, 1962.
ARPA's ambitious Advent tried too much too soon and failed. Harald Friis's check, whether a project is too big a ball of wax, guided the scope.
Pierce waited out Kelly's veto and repropose the satellite later. Kelly killed the idea over lunch in summer 1958, backed by a three-page memo. Pierce never sent his rebuttal, and after Kelly retired a January 6, 1959 proposal asking $1 million was approved as Project Echo.
The proposal argued satellites might beat cable on cost and that someone else would act if Bell did not. Technical success still lost the business: the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 created COMSAT and effectively shut AT&T out of international satellites.
Gertner tells how cellular sat shelved for decades until the parts arrived. The December 1947 Ring and Young memo laid out a honeycomb of reused frequencies but went unpublished. Microprocessors and programmable electronic switching later made locating and handing off moving callers solvable.
Frenkiel, Porter and later Engel kept drawing hexagons in spare time. Engel held that getting ahead meant spending 20 or 30 percent of your time beyond your assignment.
He shows field data and a paying pilot beating a negative market study. A fall 1971 study found no market for mobile phones at any price, and the team ignored it. Jakes rode a van for months and DiPiazza's team ran a gutted trailer overnight to measure real signal behavior.
A 1978 Chicago trial had two thousand paid subscribers over two thousand square miles. Engel concluded such studies only measure demand for products that already exist, and a mobile user could call anyone on the existing network from day one.
Gertner shows invisible infrastructure sold through concrete new features. ESS No. 1 took two thousand man-years and cost more than $100 million. AT&T sold it through call forwarding, call waiting and conference calling.
The network's ability to find people later proved hugely valuable.
Gertner sorts the Labs' failures into three kinds, each with its own cause. A missed opportunity meant having the ingredients while others assembled the breakthrough. A mistake of perception meant a better solution from elsewhere eclipsed the bet. A mistake of judgment meant a product that did not meet the need.
His examples are the integrated circuit, the waveguide and the Picturephone.
The integrated circuit was missed because of a leader's belief, not ability. Bell Labs developed diffusion and photolithography, which Kilby at Texas Instruments and Noyce at Fairchild used for the integrated circuit. Jack Morton held that chips with many components could never be reliable.
Kilby had the single-chip idea in summer 1958, probably a few months before Noyce. Both bet that the manufacturing problems could be solved later.
Gertner shows an outsider with no sunk cost seeing glass fiber first. Years and millions went into hollow waveguides, and Baker still championed them in a 1968 speech. Charles Kao visited in 1966, and Corning announced its low-loss fiber in September 1970.
Memories differ: Kao recalled a skeptical welcome, while Tingye Li and Ira Jacobs say no one dismissed him. By late November Kompfner wrote that fiber would take center stage.
He shows a sound forecast backing the wrong pathway. Fisk read the trends correctly: faster, more digital, more congested, moving to higher frequencies. His bet on millimeter waves in waveguides was the error.
The Picturephone is Gertner's case of a product nobody would pay for. Only 12 percent of couples would pay $40 to $60 a month at home, and the 1964 fair sample was not a cross section. Business users were warmer: 29 percent were interested even at $60 to $80.
The survey asked whether seeing the other person mattered but never whether people wanted to be seen. Kompfner put a photo of himself in front of his own set.
He shows a networked product with few users being worth little to each. By March 1972 Pittsburgh had eight paying Picturephone customers at $160 a month, and Chicago had 46 at $75.
Gertner's verdict: being early is not necessarily different from being wrong.
Gertner argues the lab's greatest work dissolved the monopoly that paid for it. The 1956 decree licensed about eighty-six hundred patents royalty-free. Shannon's digital information let any company code and decode messages, and cheap transistors made the shift easier for rivals.
Max Mathews' view was that an analog call passed through many amplifiers, so one entity had to control them all, and digital signals removed that need.
He shows leaders denying a threat that outsiders were already exploiting. An executive told staff only AT&T had the network, and Baker called the industry mature. MCI built a cheaper network with nothing built to last forty years and no local subsidies, and in 1971 the FCC ordered AT&T to connect it.
Justice sued on November 20, 1974. The January 1982 settlement split off the local companies, and AT&T kept long distance, Western Electric and Bell Labs.
Gertner says the lab lost its mission, so it lost its point. Pierce's 1986 verdict was that the lab inherited buildings, equipment and people, but the mission was gone. AT&T had never had to sell, so it struggled in open markets, and lab funding tightened as its parent weakened.
Lucent peaked at $270 billion, then fell from about $84 to below $2 and shrank from 150,000 workers to about 40,000. Holmdel closed in 2006: 1.9 million square feet on 472 acres. There was no clear turning point, and Nobel work went on in the 1980s.
He names the parts of the formula worth salvaging. Gertner lists patient funding, technically competent leadership, a broad but directed mission, and a critical mass of disciplines working together to understand problems deeply. Venture capital will not fund open-ended science, and tech giants answer to shareholders.
He sees today's models as strong on incremental products but leaving a gap for fundamental, risky breakthroughs.
Gertner points to Janelia Farm and Energy Department hubs as the nearest heirs. Janelia Farm opened in 2006 on 689 acres, with about three hundred researchers and a hundred visiting scholars and no teaching, grading or grant chasing. Chu told a Senate committee in 2009 that the Department of Energy must be the modern Bell Labs of energy research.
His hubs remain a modest first step in size and scope. In 2006, 77 of the 88 US entities producing significant innovations got federal funding.
Bell Labs turned hard technical problems into products deployed at massive scale by pairing patient research with development, manufacturing and a mission someone depended on. Its wins and misses, from the transistor and cellular to the Picturephone and the integrated circuit, show how new ideas displace old ones and why invention alone is not innovation.
Gertner wrote The Idea Factory (2012) about Bell Labs and American innovation. The book follows the research arm of monopoly AT&T, for decades the world's most innovative scientific organization. It asks how that lab turned hard problems into products used at massive scale.
The subtitle frames it as the great age of American innovation.
Gertner argues large organizations, not only nimble startups, can produce major innovation. He sees a three-step pattern: grasp a hard problem, gather ideas, then push to a product deployed at massive scale.
He says the pattern still fits today's wicked problems, such as information overload, infectious disease and climate change.
He sizes Bell Labs' mission as an effort rivaling Apollo and the Manhattan Project. Connecting everyone and their machines matched those projects in size, expense and duration. At its late-1960s peak the Labs employed about fifteen thousand people, including some twelve hundred PhDs.
Gertner does not hide the flaws in the Bell Labs model. It served a regulated monopoly watched by the government, and it had personality clashes, institutional arrogance and later strategic missteps.
He also notes that recruits may have come for the salary in a collapsed academic market, and that the whole formula relied on monopoly funding and captive markets.
Gertner opens with Edison's trial and error as the model that hit a wall. Around 1910 American industry advanced mostly through cut-and-try work. In 1877 Edison found a compressed carbon button improved the telephone mouthpiece, after trying lead, copper, manganese, graphite, osmium, silicon, boron, platinum and many other materials.
Edison was not anti-intellectual. He read widely and hired mathematicians for the theory, but he scorned theory itself.
He shows some limits were gaps in science, not gaps in engineering. Thick copper, loading coils and mechanical repeaters topped out around 1,700 miles, roughly New York to Denver. Stacking mechanical repeaters added distortion and undid the gain.
A coast-to-coast call needed an amplifier that science had not yet produced.
Jewett and Carty framed the 1909 bet as a short list of questions. Can we build it now? If not, what has science not shown? Will science show the way, and in time? The last question set the work plan: what must we do to make "possibly" into "probably" in two years?
They reached the framing in San Francisco, debating whether they could link New York to the coast in time for the exposition, and decided the crux was an amplifier.
Jewett asked Millikan for his best students and gave Arnold one dated task. In fall 1910 Harold Arnold accepted, and his sole job was a repeater. His high-vacuum tube carried the transcontinental line, which opened in 1915.
The line ran four copper wires on 130,000 poles, and a three-minute call to California cost about $21, about $440 today. The win justified hiring more young scientists, including Kelly in late 1917 at $2,100 a year.
Gertner shows scientists were hired to serve the phone system, not science. Harvey Fletcher had a physics PhD, yet spent his first year at Western Electric climbing poles, installing phones and running switchboards. Later recruits sat through weeks of seminars on how the Bell System worked.
Jewett was clear the lab existed to raise phone revenue. AT&T publicity later suggested scientists came for science, which Gertner treats as incidental.
He credits a growing system for never running out of hard problems. Phone parts had to last forty years, so engineers built a woodpecker machine for finishes, an artificial mouth for handsets and a simulated finger for dialing. The 512A teletypewriter oiler was designed to dispense up to fifteen drops and no more.
Donald Quarles's team found eight inches of vertical wire spacing prevented abrasion, where company practice had suggested twelve. Steel tape on cables kept gophers off.
Kelly's clear target gave direction when nobody knew the method. In 1937 Kelly told Shockley he wanted the relays out of telephone exchanges, replaced by something electronic. On December 29, 1939, Shockley sketched a copper-oxide solid-state amplifier in his notebook.
Brattain laughed because he had already tried a variation. Units built in early 1940 showed nothing, and the war halted the work.
Gertner credits a protected monopoly for the patience that research needs. Vail accepted regulated prices and profits in exchange for a cleared path to near monopoly, which gave a decades-long horizon. Stable funding let the lab plan five, ten and twenty years out, and guaranteed markets meant good work would be used.
Kelly twice handed the AT&T president his resignation over underfunded work. Both times he got the money. Bell Telephone Laboratories began January 1, 1925, with a budget of about $12 million.
He describes Murray Hill as a building engineered for collisions. Every wing connected, a 700-foot physics corridor ran through it, and labs and offices were kept apart so people had to walk past each other. Steel walls moved in six-foot steps so teams could resize fast.
More than eighty industrial labs visited to copy it. It opened in 1942, cost about $4.1 million and held about nine hundred scientists and assistants.
Kelly built teams by mixing skills and paying for the missing piece. In July 1945 he regrouped research into interdisciplinary teams. Shockley and Fisk judged only about three people in the country could fill the group's theory gap, and Kelly offered Bardeen a salary well above any university's.
With no office free, Bardeen joined in October 1945 and set up in the lab Brattain shared. That accident started the theorist and experimenter partnership. One demoted supervisor wept as Kelly read the new structure aloud.
Gertner shows skilled support staff and in-house training as real infrastructure. Bell Labs employed thousands of technical assistants, some with only a high school diploma, and started Kelly College in 1948 to train staff beyond graduate school. Universities could offer only half, or at best two-thirds, of the Labs' $3,000 starting salary.
Physicist John Rowell called the assistants keepers of practical information, secrets, tricks and lore.
For TAT-1, Kelly chose proven parts and then squeezed more from them. He barred the new transistor and used late-1930s vacuum tubes, some tested continuously for sixteen years, because the cable had to run twenty years without failure. TAT-1 opened September 25, 1956, and its technology never failed once in twenty-two years.
TASI later doubled the cable from thirty-six to seventy-two channels by reusing pauses in speech, since a talker sends signals only about 35 percent of the time.
Gertner separates discovery, invention and innovation as three different stages. Discovery observes nature. Invention engineers science into something new. Innovation turns that into a product in wide practical use.
Karl Jansky heard a steady hiss from the Milky Way at Holmdel in the early 1930s. It founded radio astronomy but never produced a profitable telecom device, and discoveries, unlike inventions, are not patentable.
He tells how the transistor's verification climbed one level at a time. Ralph Bown's test was to show gain on real speech, feed output back into input, and confirm a steady oscillation. News then went up one management level at a time, a week or two apart, and Kelly heard about a month later.
On December 16, 1947, Brattain slit gold foil on a plastic triangle with a razor and got real gain. Neither he nor Robert Gibney fully understood the physics.
The transistor shows how long turning an invention into innovation takes. It was discovered and invented in a few weeks of late 1947, but humidity, a hand wave or a slammed door changed the point-contact version's behavior. Jack Morton's team made five thousand working units by summer 1949, and the device was ready for large-scale production only by summer 1951.
Gordon Teal worked secretly from 5 p.m. to 3 a.m. on borrowed equipment to pull single germanium crystals. Shockley called the result the essential missing ingredient.
Gertner shows manufacturability, not peak performance, picked the winning transistor. The first silicon transistor in January 1954 mattered little because it was too complex to mass produce. Tanenbaum's 1955 diffused silicon transistor beat every germanium device and looked easy to make.
Tanenbaum judged it a cinch to make, and Morton cut short a European trip to back it. Kelly's better-or-cheaper test also applied to switching, so electronic switching took nearly twenty years to fully deploy.
The silicon solar battery shows a brilliant pilot failing on cost. It was at least fifteen times more efficient than prior converters, yet cost several hundred dollars per watt. In 1956 Chapin put the cost of powering a house at nearly $1.5 million.
In space nothing else could recharge batteries, so the weakness stopped mattering and the cell found its problem.
Bell spread the transistor on purpose, and Gertner notes the antitrust pressure behind it. Bell gave away samples, licensed for $25,000, and taught hundreds at Murray Hill conventions in 1951 and 1952. Outside engineers improved the device, and the originator was best placed to profit.
MIT's Jay Forrester saw it might serve high-speed digital computing, a use Bell had not planned. The openness was partly forced, since hoarding the device risked antitrust scrutiny.
Gertner presents Claude Shannon as a lone mind who founded a field. Shannon's 1948 communication paper appeared in the Bell System Technical Journal in July and October, and the word bit came from John Tukey. He stated the field's main results and proved most of them at once.
Gertner's point is that the transistor would likely have arrived elsewhere within a couple of years, while Shannon was different. Shannon still insisted his work did not rank with relativity.
Gertner shows Shannon's unstructured freedom giving fame but fading output. Theseus, the maze mouse, made him a public figure, and his 1949 chess paper was the first ever on chess programming. Unfinished papers piled up in boxes and most letters went unanswered.
In 1956 he left for MIT, feeling stale after fifteen years. Managers were reassured when chess was framed as a wedge toward call routing, translation and military decisions.
He credits John Pierce as the instigator who spots and pushes ideas. Pierce found Kompfner's traveling wave tube in a 1943 British report and brought it to Bell Labs. He also named the transistor and pushed Max Mathews toward computer music in 1957.
His summary of the tube: "Rudi invented the traveling wave tube and I discovered it." His harsh reviews had costs, and people feared his office.
Shockley shows how a manager competing with his reports can wreck a team. Left out of the point-contact invention, Shockley filled 19 notebook pages in 2 days over New Year's Eve and designed the junction transistor in secret. The design was better, but Bardeen left for Illinois and Brattain asked to stop reporting to him.
Kelly judged him unfit for upper management and refused to promote him. Shockley left for Palo Alto, and in 1957 Moore and seven others left after he asked staff to take polygraph tests.
Gertner reads the stars' fading outside the Labs as proof of the institution. Outside the Labs, Shockley's science dried up without supervisors and technicians to offset his flaws. Shannon turned to the stock market and juggling, and Pierce found Caltech unmoored.
Bardeen is the counterexample: at Illinois he won a second physics Nobel in 1972 for superconductivity.
He portrays Bill Baker probing any claim that a topic was completely understood. At a monthly meeting the director of chemical research called a topic completely understood. Baker asked a question, then a question about the answer, layer by layer, until it was clear the topic was not understood at all.
The habit had a cost: Baker revealed little of himself, and even close colleagues were unsure what he meant. Gertner also notes a patent study in which top inventors often ate with Harry Nyquist, who drew them out with good questions.
Gertner shows Pierce's satellite built from parts made for other jobs. Telstar combined sixteen Bell inventions patented over twenty-five years, none made for space. Chaffee's 1937 frequency modulation feedback receiver, thought largely useless, proved vital for Echo and Telstar.
Rockets and money came only after Sputnik in October 1957, then the creation of NASA.
He credits a cheap research experiment before the full development build. Echo, a passive balloon, cost under $2 million and used about three dozen men. Telstar took more than five hundred engineers and fifteen thousand parts, and NASA charged $3 million to launch it on June 10, 1962.
ARPA's ambitious Advent tried too much too soon and failed. Harald Friis's check, whether a project is too big a ball of wax, guided the scope.
Pierce waited out Kelly's veto and repropose the satellite later. Kelly killed the idea over lunch in summer 1958, backed by a three-page memo. Pierce never sent his rebuttal, and after Kelly retired a January 6, 1959 proposal asking $1 million was approved as Project Echo.
The proposal argued satellites might beat cable on cost and that someone else would act if Bell did not. Technical success still lost the business: the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 created COMSAT and effectively shut AT&T out of international satellites.
Gertner tells how cellular sat shelved for decades until the parts arrived. The December 1947 Ring and Young memo laid out a honeycomb of reused frequencies but went unpublished. Microprocessors and programmable electronic switching later made locating and handing off moving callers solvable.
Frenkiel, Porter and later Engel kept drawing hexagons in spare time. Engel held that getting ahead meant spending 20 or 30 percent of your time beyond your assignment.
He shows field data and a paying pilot beating a negative market study. A fall 1971 study found no market for mobile phones at any price, and the team ignored it. Jakes rode a van for months and DiPiazza's team ran a gutted trailer overnight to measure real signal behavior.
A 1978 Chicago trial had two thousand paid subscribers over two thousand square miles. Engel concluded such studies only measure demand for products that already exist, and a mobile user could call anyone on the existing network from day one.
Gertner shows invisible infrastructure sold through concrete new features. ESS No. 1 took two thousand man-years and cost more than $100 million. AT&T sold it through call forwarding, call waiting and conference calling.
The network's ability to find people later proved hugely valuable.
Gertner sorts the Labs' failures into three kinds, each with its own cause. A missed opportunity meant having the ingredients while others assembled the breakthrough. A mistake of perception meant a better solution from elsewhere eclipsed the bet. A mistake of judgment meant a product that did not meet the need.
His examples are the integrated circuit, the waveguide and the Picturephone.
The integrated circuit was missed because of a leader's belief, not ability. Bell Labs developed diffusion and photolithography, which Kilby at Texas Instruments and Noyce at Fairchild used for the integrated circuit. Jack Morton held that chips with many components could never be reliable.
Kilby had the single-chip idea in summer 1958, probably a few months before Noyce. Both bet that the manufacturing problems could be solved later.
Gertner shows an outsider with no sunk cost seeing glass fiber first. Years and millions went into hollow waveguides, and Baker still championed them in a 1968 speech. Charles Kao visited in 1966, and Corning announced its low-loss fiber in September 1970.
Memories differ: Kao recalled a skeptical welcome, while Tingye Li and Ira Jacobs say no one dismissed him. By late November Kompfner wrote that fiber would take center stage.
He shows a sound forecast backing the wrong pathway. Fisk read the trends correctly: faster, more digital, more congested, moving to higher frequencies. His bet on millimeter waves in waveguides was the error.
The Picturephone is Gertner's case of a product nobody would pay for. Only 12 percent of couples would pay $40 to $60 a month at home, and the 1964 fair sample was not a cross section. Business users were warmer: 29 percent were interested even at $60 to $80.
The survey asked whether seeing the other person mattered but never whether people wanted to be seen. Kompfner put a photo of himself in front of his own set.
He shows a networked product with few users being worth little to each. By March 1972 Pittsburgh had eight paying Picturephone customers at $160 a month, and Chicago had 46 at $75.
Gertner's verdict: being early is not necessarily different from being wrong.
Gertner argues the lab's greatest work dissolved the monopoly that paid for it. The 1956 decree licensed about eighty-six hundred patents royalty-free. Shannon's digital information let any company code and decode messages, and cheap transistors made the shift easier for rivals.
Max Mathews' view was that an analog call passed through many amplifiers, so one entity had to control them all, and digital signals removed that need.
He shows leaders denying a threat that outsiders were already exploiting. An executive told staff only AT&T had the network, and Baker called the industry mature. MCI built a cheaper network with nothing built to last forty years and no local subsidies, and in 1971 the FCC ordered AT&T to connect it.
Justice sued on November 20, 1974. The January 1982 settlement split off the local companies, and AT&T kept long distance, Western Electric and Bell Labs.
Gertner says the lab lost its mission, so it lost its point. Pierce's 1986 verdict was that the lab inherited buildings, equipment and people, but the mission was gone. AT&T had never had to sell, so it struggled in open markets, and lab funding tightened as its parent weakened.
Lucent peaked at $270 billion, then fell from about $84 to below $2 and shrank from 150,000 workers to about 40,000. Holmdel closed in 2006: 1.9 million square feet on 472 acres. There was no clear turning point, and Nobel work went on in the 1980s.
He names the parts of the formula worth salvaging. Gertner lists patient funding, technically competent leadership, a broad but directed mission, and a critical mass of disciplines working together to understand problems deeply. Venture capital will not fund open-ended science, and tech giants answer to shareholders.
He sees today's models as strong on incremental products but leaving a gap for fundamental, risky breakthroughs.
Gertner points to Janelia Farm and Energy Department hubs as the nearest heirs. Janelia Farm opened in 2006 on 689 acres, with about three hundred researchers and a hundred visiting scholars and no teaching, grading or grant chasing. Chu told a Senate committee in 2009 that the Department of Energy must be the modern Bell Labs of energy research.
His hubs remain a modest first step in size and scope. In 2006, 77 of the 88 US entities producing significant innovations got federal funding.