
A product analytics platform for tracking user behavior.
Amplitude shows up as the starting point for experimentation at Rise, the sleep app with 10M+ users. The team uses it to find the biggest drop-offs in its web quiz and app onboarding, then picks the problem before the solution. About 70% of experiments fail first, so they iterate. Lesson: pair analytics with standardized metrics and a standard stats engine like GrowthBook.
From Rise and a quiz-funnel team on Amplitude
Start experiments from the biggest drop-off in Amplitude, then agree on the problem. The team finds the biggest drop-off in the web quiz and app onboarding in Amplitude. They then list every reason the page might not convert, such as lack of trust or an unclear value proposition, agree as a team on the biggest problem, and only then list solutions.
Everything is written down so a failed test can be diagnosed and iterated on. About 70% of their experiments fail on the first try, and they iterate on the failures to find winners. Quote: "we're obsessed with the problem and not the solution."
Rise pairs Amplitude with Segment and GrowthBook rather than judging tests in it. Rise uses Segment for tracking, Amplitude for product analytics, and GrowthBook, which sits on the warehouse, for test statistics. Product managers do not judge winners in spreadsheets, and the team does not write its own stats engine, because of pitfalls like sample ratio mismatch.
GrowthBook was Rise's biggest move toward standardizing experimentation, and it is cheap if the data is already organized. Metrics like trial start rate need clean definitions, since real user journeys are non-linear with reinstalls and returns. Quote: "never write your own statistics engine".
Its definition of a visitor differs from Google Analytics, which shows why benchmarks mislead when companies define metrics differently.
Rise pairs Amplitude with Segment and GrowthBook rather than judging tests in it. Rise uses Segment for tracking, Amplitude for product analytics, and GrowthBook, which sits on the warehouse, for test statistics. Product managers do not judge winners in spreadsheets, and the team does not write its own stats engine, because of pitfalls like sample ratio mismatch.
GrowthBook was Rise's biggest move toward standardizing experimentation, and it is cheap if the data is already organized. Metrics like trial start rate need clean definitions, since real user journeys are non-linear with reinstalls and returns. Quote: "never write your own statistics engine".
Elena took an interim head of growth role there and is now Head of Product. User adoption now comes before the head of data buys analytics, and a startup CEO can set it up in a day while a large enterprise needs a village. It also went through the enterprise overcorrection, and she has to pull back from copying past wins there.
Start experiments from the biggest drop-off in Amplitude, then agree on the problem. The team finds the biggest drop-off in the web quiz and app onboarding in Amplitude. They then list every reason the page might not convert, such as lack of trust or an unclear value proposition, agree as a team on the biggest problem, and only then list solutions.
Everything is written down so a failed test can be diagnosed and iterated on. About 70% of their experiments fail on the first try, and they iterate on the failures to find winners. Quote: "we're obsessed with the problem and not the solution."
Rise uses Amplitude for product analytics alongside Segment for tracking and GrowthBook for test statistics.
The team uses Amplitude to find the biggest drop-offs in the web quiz and app onboarding, which starts each experiment.
Its data shows about 77% of daily active users leave within the first 3 days, which is why onboarding must get users excited to pay quickly.
Its data shows an average app loses 77% of users in three days, which is why discounts must come early.
Its North Star is weekly active learning users, meaning users who found an insight and shared it with at least two others.
Its data says the average app loses 77% of daily active users within 3 days. Steve notes its numbers may be biased since it sells analytics services.
Elena was interim head of growth there until February. Volume is events sent, the individual wants behavioral data while the company wants a data-driven culture, and sustainable contracts took 12+ months of usage. Its Compass tool offers regression for PQA models.
Was hard to try because users had to install code, so it built a realistic interactive demo. The demo is not PLG, but it lets users see value and play with the product. Also named as a product analytics and experimentation option.
Laura just became head of growth, taking over from Elena Verna. She plans to add self-serve for SMBs and startups by starting from their problems, such as lacking analysts, rather than chopping up the enterprise product.
Used as an ICP example: a software company with at least a couple of product managers. PMs are the users, and the budget owner may be the VP of product, VP of engineering or CTO.
It has long documentation on event tracking and adds analytics power as a company grows, but lacks CRM features.
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